Seminar on Decision Theory
Thursday, 11AM-12:30PM, Michaelmas Term 2015
Philosophy Common Room, Faculty of Philosophy
Readings & Notes
- 8 October, 2015
- *Ahmed, A. (2014). Evidence, Decision and Causality. Cambridge University Press. Chapter 0. Book DOI
- Nozick, R. (1969). Newcomb’s problem and two principles of choice. In Rescher, N., editor, Essays in honor of Carl G. Hempel, pages 114-146. Springer.
- Joyce, J. M. and Gibbard, A. (1998). Causal Decision Theory. In Barbera, S., Hammond, P., and Seidl, C., editors, Handbook of Utility Theory, volume 1: Principles, pages 627-666. Kluwer Academic Publishers. Sections 1-3
- 15 October, 2015
- *Ahmed, A. (2014). Evidence, Decision and Causality. Cambridge University Press. Chapter 1. Book DOI
- Savage, L. J. (1972). The Foundations of Statistics. Dover Publications, Inc., second revised edition. Chapters 1-5
- Savage, L. J. (1967). Difficulties in the theory of personal probability. Philosophy of Science, 34(4): 305-310.
- 22 October, 2015
- *Spohn, W. (1977). Where Luce and Krantz do really generalize Savage’s decision model. Erkenntnis, 11(1):113-134. JSTOR
- Jeffrey, R. C. (1983). The Logic of Decision. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2nd edition. Chapters 4-5.
- Luce, R. D. and Krantz, D. H. (1971). Conditional expected utility. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 39(2):253–271.
- 5 November, 2015
- *Rabinowicz, W. (2002). Does practical deliberation crowd out self-prediction? Erkenntnis, 57(1):91–122. JSTOR
- Levi, I. (2007). Deliberation does crowd out prediction. Hommage a Wlodek: Philosophical Papers Dedicated to Wlodek Rabinowitz. PDF
- Levi, I. (1989). Rationality, prediction, and autonomous choice. In The Covenant of Reason: rationality and the commitments of thought, pages 19–39. Cambridge University Press 1997.
- 19 November, 2015
- *Hájek, A. (2015), Deliberation Welcomes Prediction. Manuscript
- *Price, H. (2015), What Ramsey Got Right. Slides
- Ismael, J. (2012). Decision and the open future. In Bardon, A., editor, The Future of the Philosophy of Time, pages 149–168. Routledge. Pre-print
- Price, H. (2012). Causation, chance, and the rational significance of supernatural evidence. Philosophical Review, 121(4): 483-538.
- 25 November, 2015, 10:30AM
- *Gaifman, H. (1999). Self-reference and the acyclicity of rational choice. Annals of Pure and Applied Logic, 96(1-3):117 – 140. DOI
- van Fraassen, B. (1995). Belief and the Problem of Ulysses and the Sirens, Philosophical Studies 77 (1), 7 – 37. DOI
- 3 December, 2015
- *Spohn, W. (2012). Reversing 30 years of discussion: Why causal decision theorists should one-box. Synthese, 187(1):95–122. DOI
- Yudkowsky, E., et al., Logical Decision Theory.
- Soares, N. and Fallenstein, B. (2015). Toward Idealized Decision Theory, arXiv:1507.01986
News & Updates
26 November’s meeting has been moved to 25 November 10:30am. (19/11)
No meeting on 12 November, Huw is away for conference. (5/11)
No meeting on 29 October, Yang is away for conference. (22/10)
The notes for the third meeting are updated. (22/10)
The notes for the second meeting are updated. (16/10)
Recommended readings for each meeting are starred, the others are optional. Most readings are available online through JSTOR or university library. (15/10)