Seminar on Decision Theory

Thursday, 11AM-12:30PM, Michaelmas Term 2015
Philosophy Common Room, Faculty of Philosophy

Readings & Notes

8 October, 2015

*Ahmed, A. (2014). Evidence, Decision and Causality. Cambridge University Press. Chapter 0. Book DOI
Nozick, R. (1969). Newcomb’s problem and two principles of choice. In Rescher, N., editor, Essays in honor of Carl G. Hempel, pages 114-146. Springer.
Joyce, J. M. and Gibbard, A. (1998). Causal Decision Theory. In Barbera, S., Hammond, P., and Seidl, C., editors, Handbook of Utility Theory, volume 1: Principles, pages 627-666. Kluwer Academic Publishers. Sections 1-3
15 October, 2015

*Ahmed, A. (2014). Evidence, Decision and Causality. Cambridge University Press. Chapter 1. Book DOI
Savage, L. J. (1972). The Foundations of Statistics. Dover Publications, Inc., second revised edition. Chapters 1-5
Savage, L. J. (1967). Difficulties in the theory of personal probability. Philosophy of Science, 34(4): 305-310.
22 October, 2015

*Spohn, W. (1977). Where Luce and Krantz do really generalize Savage’s decision model. Erkenntnis, 11(1):113-134. JSTOR
Jeffrey, R. C. (1983). The Logic of Decision. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2nd edition. Chapters 4-5.
Luce, R. D. and Krantz, D. H. (1971). Conditional expected utility. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 39(2):253–271.
5 November, 2015

*Rabinowicz, W. (2002). Does practical deliberation crowd out self-prediction? Erkenntnis, 57(1):91–122. JSTOR
Levi, I. (2007). Deliberation does crowd out prediction. Hommage a Wlodek: Philosophical Papers Dedicated to Wlodek Rabinowitz. PDF
Levi, I. (1989). Rationality, prediction, and autonomous choice. In The Covenant of Reason: rationality and the commitments of thought, pages 19–39. Cambridge University Press 1997.
19 November, 2015

*Hájek, A. (2015), Deliberation Welcomes Prediction. Manuscript
*Price, H. (2015), What Ramsey Got Right. Slides
Ismael, J. (2012). Decision and the open future. In Bardon, A., editor, The Future of the Philosophy of Time, pages 149–168. Routledge. Pre-print
Price, H. (2012). Causation, chance, and the rational significance of supernatural evidence. Philosophical Review, 121(4): 483-538.
25 November, 2015, 10:30AM

*Gaifman, H. (1999). Self-reference and the acyclicity of rational choice. Annals of Pure and Applied Logic, 96(1-3):117 – 140. DOI
van Fraassen, B. (1995). Belief and the Problem of Ulysses and the Sirens, Philosophical Studies 77 (1), 7 – 37. DOI
3 December, 2015

*Spohn, W. (2012). Reversing 30 years of discussion: Why causal decision theorists should one-box. Synthese, 187(1):95–122. DOI
Yudkowsky, E., et al., Logical Decision Theory.
Soares, N. and Fallenstein, B. (2015). Toward Idealized Decision Theory, arXiv:1507.01986

*Recommended readings.

News & Updates

26 November’s meeting has been moved to 25 November 10:30am. (19/11)

No meeting on 12 November, Huw is away for conference. (5/11)

No meeting on 29 October, Yang is away for conference. (22/10)

The notes for the third meeting are updated. (22/10)

The notes for the second meeting are updated. (16/10)

Recommended readings for each meeting are starred, the others are optional. Most readings are available online through JSTOR or university library. (15/10)